Countering Radicalization in Pakistan: Efforts Must be Initiated From Within the Society

SAVE Pakistan members Shabana Fayyaz and Arshi Salim Hashmi took part in a discussion on countering radicalization in Pakistan at the Pak Institute of Peace Studies.

It is important to challenge the extremist and literalist interpretations of Islam to prevent further radicalization in Pakistan and defeat the militant groups operating in the country.


This was the crux of a seminar organized by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies on July 16, 2010, in Islamabad.


The seminar was arranged to launch the latest edition of the organization’s quarterly journal, Conflict and Peace Studies. The journal contained the finding of a survey that was recently conducted by PIPS to study the trends and patterns of religious radicalization in Pakistan. The findings were further explained in research papers that examined the phenomenon from multiple dimensions.


While the participants of the seminar agreed on the importance of developing counter narratives to defeat the extremist ideology, they disagreed on the strategy. Dr Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, the acting President of Islamabad Policy Research Institute who chaired the meeting, blamed the state for being negligent in this regard. But Dr Shabana Fayyaz thought that these counter narratives must be developed by the civil society, not the state. Wajahat Ali, a journalist, maintained that the state had a role to play. However, he also added that it must try to reclaim its lost credibility first. Speakers agreed that any direct involvement of the state to promote or support a particular set of thought in response to extremists’ ideology will be counter-productive and fraught with various challenges.


Commenting on the topic, Arshi Salim Hashmi, Senior Research Analyst at Institute for Regional Studies opined that Pakistani state has failed to deal with the threat of radicalization on social level. She was of the view that when it comes to public perspective on extremism, it is very important in societies like ours to see the difference between religiosity and religious extremism.


Wajahat Ali stated that religiosity cannot be regarded as a manifestation of radicalization. He further elaborated that in order to formulate effective counter-strategies, it is imperative to understand the phenomenon of radicalization in Pakistani context. The pervasive confusion over the various issues including Pakistan’s decision to support international campaign against terrorism, the U.S drone strikes in Pakistan and the issue of Jihad is manipulated by the militant groups to forward their own agenda. He observed that the average Pakistani takes his religion seriously and wants to see it in the public domain. But unlike the Taliban, he does not want to make it claustrophobic to other people. He wants to progress. But he does not want to abandon his religion.


Mr. Manzar Abbas Zaidi, Director Research at National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA), presented on the issue of radicalization in a conceptual framework. While pointing towards various flaws in academic research on the issue, he said that the term “radical” does not have any negative connotation according to classic linguistic standards. However, in the context of Pakistan, it is defined as a tendency to use a peculiar brand of religion, as the justification for conquest and control over territory, populations and resources. Mr. Zaidi noted that if one has to believe that radicalization is a process, there are four stages of radicalization i.e. Pre-radicalization, Self-identification, Indoctrination and Extremism and a number of social, religious, political and economic factors influence an individual during the process of radicalization. Based on his interactions with imprisoned militants, Mr. Zaidi revealed that those people are happily settled in their thoughts and it will not be an easy task to shake extremists’ convictions. He also negated the general perception about the religious seminaries for their alleged role in promoting radicalization and militancy in society. Militant threat from Madrassa is overblown and this is validated by various researches on this subject, he noted.


Experts’ presentations on the issue were followed by a lively QA session. Responding to a question relating to cultivating counter-narratives to extremist’s ideologies; the chairperson said that our state has been negligent to this challenge of cultivating counter-narratives. Speakers called upon the civil society organizations and intellectuals to come forward and take the lead to undo such hate ideologies. While commenting on the need for defining radicalization in local context, Director PIPS, Mr. Amir Rana asserted that PIPS has already accomplished this task through extensive research and repeated interactions with the leading national and international subject-specialists. Hence, we need to move forward to adopt some practical measures to counter this phenomenon.


This article was posted by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies.

"Recent Developments in Jamat-E-Islami, Pakistan," by Arshi Saleem Hashmi

Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan is one of the main religious political parties in the country, supported the Islamization process during Gen. Zia's regime as well as Afghan Jihad in 1980s. They have never come out openly against Taliban and always say that Taliban insurgency is the reaction of the US attack on Afghanistan. They are in the forefront in all the anti-American protests in the country. Interestingly, they never get more than 1% of the total vote in general elections but always find ways to be in coalitions. Below are excerpts from a commentary on their political role in Pakistan and their policies in the region written by Arshi Saleem Hashmi for the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. There are similar branches of Jamat-e-Islami in India and Bangladesh adn there is a very strong Jamat-e-Islam women's wing as well. You can find the complete report here. Arshi Saleem Hashmi is a Senior Research Analyst at the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, and an Assistant Professor at the National Defense University, Islamabad.

Syed Munnawar Hasan is the new Amir of Jamat-e-Islami (JeI). Considered to be a hardliner in the party, it is fair to say that he has a life from one extreme to another. The JeI leadership is not dynastic; the party has always held elections to choose its office holders. Party members cannot seek leadership; instead a politburo of sorts (Shura) proposes three candidates from whom the party members then choose their Ameer for a four-year term.

JeI is an ideological party but it is clearly divided between the ideologues and pragmatists. Another important issue within the party is ethnicity: there are Pashtuns and then Muhajirs (Urdu-speaking migrants from India).

Given the fact that the current leadership is quite inflexible vis-à-vis the West and its policies, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, there will be a hard-line approach on part of the Jamat-e-Islami in future. An indication is the recent initiative by JeI and other religious parties in Pakistan who agreed to adopt a joint strategy against the US intervention in the country but the expected announcement of the revival of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) has not been made. However, a lot has to be sorted out before another MMA alliance takes shape. The Sunni Itehad believes that fundamentalism and terrorism would re-emerge in the country with the reunion of the MMA, as its last regime in the North West Frontier Provinces (NWFP) provided the Taliban and other al Qaeda-linked terrorist groups safe havens there.

When it comes to Kashmir, JeI is adamant on its decades-old policy of no compromise on the future of Kashmir. It seems that JeI still believes in "Kashmir jihad."

JeI Pakistan described the US's new Afghan policy as "a declaration of war against the tribesmen in Pakistan's tribal region."

It seems that JeI Pakistan will remain a small group. The 2008 elections clearly indicated the frustration with the religious right, but people have very short memories and now that the "secular," "progressive" government of PPP is not doing enough for the people, they might again turn towards the Islamists. Within just two years, public opinion is once again changing, and JeI is shrewd enough to make the most out of it.

Like in the past, religious parties, particularly JeI, would in some way or the other remain in close alliance with the military if not overtly; they would reach an understanding together as the military now does not want to be seen as criticizing the government. We should not underestimate JeI’s street power and mosque to mosque network. Its presence in universities and neighborhoods are unmatched for mass mobilization.

JeI will continue to remain active through its vast network in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Kashmir. However, on the domestic front, the rivalry with the MQM would hamper any hope for JeI to monopolize the politics of urban Sindh. JeI is desperate to expand its political influence which is fast fading away; there will be more show of street power against government’s inability to provide basic needs to people, against drone attacks, against the occupation of Afghanistan and against the US facilitated India-Pakistan normalization of relations.

In desperation to achieve political influence, the JeI might come under Nawaz Sharif flag. Hence the possibility of a new alliance emerging from Raiwand (Lahore) led by Sharifs does exist, but it depends on a numbers of other factors as well. The pro-Taliban slogan may not help them this time but anti-US stance would surely fetch them many votes.

Our Lost South Asian Identity and the Roots of Present Day Extremism in Pakistan, by Arshi Saleem Hashmi

Pakistan is undoubtedly going through tough times; many of the troubles that Pakistan is facing are due to the policies we adopted deliberately and unwillingly as they were imposed from the outside. The remnants of the “jihad” which began after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and appeared as the modern global jihad in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan’s border areas near Afghanistan have made the whole world hostage to the irrational agenda.

With the “Islamization” of Pakistan in 1980s, we have become an increasingly ideological state. However, at that time there was no single definition available to explain what Islamization was or what it would look like in Pakistan. With a number of sects and varied types of “Islam,” the Deobandi school of thought became the official theology to consult for theoretical explanations. With its close resemblance to Saudi Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia became a major patron and ideological influence, even though a majority of Pakistanis were and still are adherents of the Brelvi/Sufi tradition of Islam.

The Arabist shift from Pakistan’s Indo-Persian culture was confused with Islamization process, which in turn led to a monolithic world view derived from Islamic orthodoxy, and soon after became the guiding principle for radical young minds in Pakistan. Domestic and international politics as well as societal issues are articulated in purely religious idioms. Instead of emphasizing the notion of Pakistan as a nation-state based on cultural and religious pluralism, ideas like Islamic universalism, militancy, and “Islam versus the other” are highlighted by radical religious groups. This process has affected the psyche of the whole nation.

The Zia regime linked Arabism with Islam, not realizing or deliberately ignoring the fact that Islam is a religion, while “Arabism” is more of a cultural notion. “Islamization” of the society through “Arabization” was considered the right policy, however. Ignoring Pakistan’s South Asian culture and imposing Arab culture instead created both confusion and a vacuum, and that vacuum was filled by radical ideas and extremism. Pakistani society got confused about its identity and in its bid to link itself with Arab culture, it lost its own South Asian identity. 

A little example is the head cover or scarf. Pakistani women traditionally wear a big shawl—some cover their head, and some don’t. In undivided India, there was a culture of wearing the Burqa (veil), but the typical Arab head scarf has never been the practice. With the Arabist shift, women started to show their links with Arab culture by wearing a head scarf. Similarly, many men started growing a Middle Eastern-style beard, like the style of beard that most men in the United Arab Emirates and other Arab countries sport.

There is nothing wrong in one’s personal choices regarding culture or head scarves, but when they are imposed from the top down and do not evolve at the grassroots level, these policies create confusion and lack social acceptability. That is why once the Islamization process stopped and Pakistan decided to become an ally of the US after 9/11, Pakistani society suddenly accepted their “freedom” and immediately started expressing the traditional norms and cultural practices from before, including religious pilgrimages to the shrines of Sufi saints.

When people see cultural activities that are Islamic in nature but culturally-specific, they assume that these are new phenomena emerging now in Pakistan. No, actually until the 1970s we were happy with the way we were—culturally, religiously, and politically. It was in 1980s that our identity was crushed and a foreign identity was imposed upon us, and at that time we were told that we had to abandon our links with South Asia if we wanted to achieve the highest level of religious purity. Similarly, the culture of civil society, like literary clubs, sports, art, theater, music, movies and literary clubs, has all been there in Pakistan previously. It is not as though we never tasted these things before and are now being introduced to these things. For a period of more than 20 years in our history, we were denied our right to feel proud of being South Asian.

Pakistan at present faces the challenge of reinventing itself both at the state and societal level. But more so, it needs to have a top down approach to reform, reconstructing the conceptual and ideological orientation of Pakistan to undo the official enforcement of a particular sect of Islam. If the society appears indifferent about the nature of religiosity, it is not because people want it the way things are today, but there is a great deal of confusion about Pakistani culture and religion. This confusion can only be removed if steps are taken officially to de-radicalize our society through an education syllabus, media programs, and the growth of free intellectual discourse on religion and cultural nature of the society in Pakistani context.

The real clash in Pakistan is not between Islam and the West as projected, but between the orthodox and the moderates. The key question is, “How far will the new generation change our society from the one lost to orthodoxy and militancy?” Pakistan’s inability to control radicalization limits its capacity to engage in a sustained effort to control extremism and terrorism, and we must struggle to revive the pluralist and tolerant spirit of Pakistan.

I believe that when people are given the right and the space to express their cultural identity, it contributes to the evolution of the society in general and keeps a balance between various ethnic, religious, and political groups.

Now the small minority who calls itself the “best of the best Muslim,” and hence wants to purify the society from the “ills” of non-Muslims, are very small percentage of our society. But they have made a hostage of our society because they are brutal and they have weapons—they do not care if they kill a child, a woman, or an old person. We all hope, however, that with the military operations in our country and a newly-adopted government policy against extremism of all kinds, we will soon regain our lost identity which is very dear to all of us, which is the identity of Pakistan, a moderate, South Asian Muslim country.

For more information on Pakistan’s culture, Arshi suggests that you visit the following website:  http://pakistan.saarctourism.org/pakistan-picture.html.

Arshi Saleem Hashmi is a Senior Research Analyst at the Institute of Regional Studies in Islamabad and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the National Defense University of Islamabad. Arshi is also a member of SAVE, Sisters Against Violent Extremism, and is helping create a chapter there to mobilize and empower women to fight violent extremism and radicalization.

For more information about SAVE or its parent organization, Women without Borders, please visit our website at www.women-without-borders.org or write us an email at office@women-without-borders.org.